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SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Capstar argues that while the Lawrences did cite the correct authority regarding summary 
judgment, that authority seemingly ignores the posture of the case. Citing Intermountain Forest 
Management v. Louisiana Pacific, Capstar goes on to argue that the trial court is entitled to arrive 
at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence and to grant summary 
judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. In support of this argument, Capstar 
seemingly inserts itself in the mind of the trial court and attempts to explain all the inferences the 
trial court made in reaching its decision. Capstar's argument as to what inferences the trial court 
may have made is nothing more than mere conjecture and speculation and is totally irrelevant 
regarding the issue of whether or not summary judgment was proper. Capstar simply is not in a 
position to argue how the trial court arrived at its decision, unless and only unless, the trial court 
provided some explanation in its written decision. 
Where Capstar errors in its interpretation and application of Intermountain to the present 
case, is that the facts as offered by Capstar are being aggressively disputed. If the Lawrences had 
failed to produce rebuttal evidence of any kind, then the trail court may have been correct to 
draw probable inferences from the Rook and Funk affidavits. But that is not what we have in this 
case. The Lawrences deposed both Rook and Funk, offered conflicting affidavits from Bruce 
Anderson, Wilber Mead, and others, and submitted court rulings, maps, county records, and 
business records, all in an effort to defeat the affidavits authored by Capstar's legal team and sent 
to Funk and Rook to sign. The trial court simply abused its discretion in its summary judgment 
ruling. 
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THE EVIDENTIARY ERRORS 
The Appellant's opening brief remunerated twenty-four evidentiary errors made by the 
trial court which in its reply brief, Capstar characterizes as either harmless scrivener errors, 
"probable inferences", and/or irrelevant. The issue is, that the overwhelming majority of these 
errors cannot be dismissed as either harmless scrivener's errors or probable inferences. The fact 
of the matter is, the trial court simply did not get its evidentiary facts correct and the Lawrences 
were denied their due process rights. And, regardless of how Capstar may want to portray these 
errors, under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, 
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 
P2d 708, 716 (1994). 
Because this is not the first time the Lawrences are appearing on appeal in this matter, it 
is entirely fair to say that the trial court has a record of making error(s). And, it needs to be noted, 
that while the Lawrences prevailed on an earlier appeal, the reversal of that summary judgment 
didn't erase the trail court's earlier errors, it just corrected the judgment. Those earlier errors are 
entirely relevant to the "whole body" of errors produced by the trial court in this matter. 
Especially, given the fact that both sets of errors, those noted on the first appeal, and those noted 
in the present appeal, included among other things, the trial court's interpretation of the subject to 
and including language of Funk/Human Sale Agreement (which is addressed at some length later 
in this brief), both sets of errors resulted in summary judgment rulings declaring the existence of 
easements in favor of the Respondents. Listed below are just a few of the errors made by the trial 
court: 
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• A finding that the very same deed that was found to be ambiguous in the Tower case was 
repeatedly found to be clear and unambiguous in the Capstar proceeding, is not a 
harmless error, but a fundamental error. 
• A finding that the subject to and including language in the Funk/Human sale agreement 
was "unambiguous" and that such language created an express easement in favor of 
Cap star, is not a harmless error, but a fundamental error. [R. 32090 p.83] 
• A finding that Funk took great care to reserve an easement across the parcel sold to 
Human Synergistics in 1975; however, he errantly put that language in the Sale 
Agreement, is not a harmless error, but a fundamental error. 
• A finding that the reason there is no express easement is the most convincing evidence as 
to the implied easement theory, is not a harmless scrivener's error. 
• A finding that the Rebeor's affidavit shows that he managed the tower site for Capstar, IS 
not a harmless error, but a fundamental error. 
• A finding that Nextel assigned the Access License Agreement to Capstar, is not a 
harmless error, but a fundamental error. 
• A finding that Funk used the property consistently from the six year period from the day 
he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he moved from the area, is not a harmless error, 
but a fundamental error. 
• A finding that the use Capstar seeks is no different than the prescriptive use Funk made of 
the Lawrences' land, is not a harmless error, but a fundamental error. 
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• A finding that when Funk sold the Section 21 parcel to Human Synergistics, Funk 
included in the sales contract language that gave notice that Funk intended to continue to 
use the road for ingress/egress, is not a harmless error, but a fundamental error. 
• A finding that the Funks and their successors used the road openly, continuously, without 
interruption, under a claim of right for much longer than the statutory period requires, is 
not a harmless error, but a fundamental error. 
Capstar is simply wrong to characterize the errors the trial court made as either harmless 
scriveners errors or "probable inferences" within the trial court's prerogative to make. 
Capstar also identified items F, J, K, L, M, N, 0, P, Q, R, and S in the Appellant's opening 
brief as issues Capstar considers irrelevant to the present appeal. Capstar suggests that all are 
statements made by the trail court regarding the Tower Asset Litigation. And, because of that, 
this Court should disregard them. Capstar certainly doesn't offer any explanation as to why each 
and everyone is irrelevant, nor do they cite any case law in support. Neither have they offered 
any legal foundation establishing why Appellants cannot point to ALL the trial court errors in it's 
written decision they are appealing to a higher Court to review. 
The Lawrences did not ask the trial court to offer one opinion for both cases. And, had the 
trial court offered two separate written decisions, Capstar MIGHT have a valid argument. The 
problem for Capstar is that they (both Capstar and Tower) intended that both of these cases be 
tried on the same path. It was a conscious decision on their partes). Capstar and Tower both hire 
the same attorney. Both cases happened to be assigned to the same judge. Both, file motions for 
summary judgments at or near the same time. Both schedule nearly all hearings and court 
appearances together. Both submit practically the same briefs. And, in just about every case, their 
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briefs were filed together at the same time. Both agreed that one deposition of Harold Funk be 
taken and that deposition be used for both cases. At no time, over the past nine years, has Capstar 
ever objected to the trial court issuance of one written decision to cover both cases. 
These two cases are conjoined in other ways. At the first summary judgment hearing in 
Capstar, the Lawrences moved the court for an extension of time to complete their discovery. 
Rather, than grant the extension of time for discovery, the trial court held a summary judgment 
hearing (limited to the express easement theory) and simply withheld its ruling until after a 
summary judgment hearing was held in the Tower case. Similar to Capstar, Tower also pursued a 
summary judgment ruling on ALL its easement theories as well. Facing a summary judgment 
hearing in Tower, the Lawrences abandoned their Pro Se status and retained legal representation. 
After filing a notice of appearance, the Lawrences' attorney filed for an extension to complete 
discovery. The trial court granted the extension, but then gave orders that the Tower discovery 
and summary judgment argument be limited also to the express easement theory alone. The trial 
court offered no explanation as to why the Tower discovery should be limited. If, as Capstar 
argues, the facts and proceedings in Tower are totally irrelevant to Capstar, then the trial court 
would have no apparent reason to limit the discovery (and argument) in Tower to the express 
easement theory alone. Capstar certainly didn't raise any objection to the trial court's apparent 
"conjoining" of the two cases then. 
The fact of the matter is, that for eight years Capstar and Tower have prosecuted these 
two cases very similarly and on the same calendar. They did it most likely to help keep their 
expenses down and the Appellants costs up. There can be no doubt, that defending two cases is 
certainly more expensive and time consuming than defending only one. 
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In the present matter, the Appellants are appealing from orders the trial court published 
on June 25, 2007 which is a joint Memorandum decision and order denying motion to 
disqualify for cause, 1.R.p.e 40 (d)(2), a November 30, 2007 joint Memorandum decision 
and order denying defendant's renewed motion for permission to appeal from an 
interlocutory order, I.A.R. 12, and the February 6, 2008 joint written decision Memorandum 
decision and order granting plaintiff's motion for summary jUdgment. All three orders were 
jointly published. Had Capstar taken issue with the joint publication of these orders, Capstar 
should have made an objection with the trial court at the appropriate time. However, Capstar 
made no such objection and cannot now argue that this Court should not consider the trial court's 
written decision in its entirety. 
It is also abundantly clear from the trial court's written decision that the trial court 
considered evidence and arguments from both cases in reaching its decision(s) for both. For 
example, item F, which Capstar argues is irrelevant, revolves around evidence submitted in 
Tower which the trial court relied on in ruling in favor of Capstar. Here, the trial court made the 
finding that on January 13,2003, Nextel assigned the access license agreement to Capstar. It is 
completely unclear how the trial court could arrive at such a finding since there was never any 
assignment of the Nextel License Agreement to Capstar. Regardless, it is an error in a finding of 
fact as it applies to Capstar and therefore, makes the error and the Tower record entirely relevant 
for review by this Court. 
The Appellants believe that the trial court simply "lumped" these two cases together in its 
findings of facts, decisions, and judgment making processes. This idea is supported by a couple 
of statements the trial court offered in its decision: "Additionally, the analysis above as to 
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Capstar's easement by implication from prior use, easement by necessity and easement by 
prescription, applies to the Halls [R. 35120 v. 3 p. 589] ... Just as in the Capstar case, 
Lawrences in this Tower Asset case also make the arguments of statute of limitations and 
laches ... The analysis above as to those arguments applies in the Tower Asset case [R. 35120 v.3 
p.590]. 
Lastly, there can be no doubt that the trial court made its findings in Tower entirely 
relevant to Capstar, when it published a joint written decision; and, that written decision became 
a part of the clerks record on appeal. Had the trial court believed the facts and issues in each case 
were irrelevant to the other case, then the trial court would have and should have exercised due 
care not to taint each by the other. Clearly, that is not what has happened in this case. By 
publishing joint decisions and joint findings of fact, the trial court simply made each case 
relevant to the other. All the trial court errors noted in the Appellants' opening brief are relevant 
to Capstar because the trail court made them a part of the Capstar record which is up for review. 
THE ISSUE OF NECESSITY 
Exhibit 1 is a scanned image of page 20 of Caps tar's Respondent's Brief (Docket 
#35120) containing a map that Capstar argues is an illustrative depiction of the properties in 
question utilizing a Kootenai County public road map from the Brownsberger affidavit. Capstar 
states that the properties Funks originally acquired are highlighted in yellow and the red x's on 
the map illustrate the approximate location of Mellick Road. Capstar makes the claim that this 
map is evidence that the logging road across the Funk parcel did not extend all the way to 
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Mellick and that Mellick Road crosses into Section 21 and does not provide access to his land in 
Section 22. 
Notwithstanding the fact the Lawrences raise issue with the foundation and accuracy of 
the map, even this map clearly shows Mellick road entering Funk's land in Government Lot 3, 
the SW 1;4 of the SW 1;4 of Section 15. 
During the presentation of oral argument on April 6 2010, this Court questioned Capstar's 
attorney specifically regarding the Mellick Road access to Funk's land in Section 15. The 
following verbal discourse was exchanged between Justice Horton and Ms. Weeks during oral 
argument. 
Justice Horton: "ff we're focusing on the Funk parcel, then wasn't their access to their 
parcel in Section 15 via Mellick Road? " 
Ms. Weeks: "Your honor, I know that the little map I drew, the red, touches that corner 
but the Mellick road survey and I believe if you look at the one that Judge Haman put in there 
does not take it in other than to that one corner. Yes. But it didn't continue on in. There wasn't a 
road on in. He would have had to have created the road in to there and Mr. Rook, testified ... or 
excuse me not Mr. Rook, Mr. Funk testified that that the terrain was such that it wasn't a 
reasonable option. But, yes, I do think that if you look at those that it may have touched the 
corner of Section 15 of part of his ownership. " 
Justice Horton: "Which is basically all that is requiredfor an easement by necessity, is 
that the parcel actually be accessible, not that all portions of the parcel be readily accessible. " 
Ms. Weeks: "That's correct." 
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Clearly, Ms. Weeks acknowledged to this Court that Funk's access in Section 15 was via 
Mellick Road. Furthermore, Ms. Weeks agreed with Justice Horton that all that is required is that 
the parcel is accessible and not all portions of the parcel be accessible. Yet, Capstar's reply brief 
appears to be a reversal from Ms. Week's acknowledgments to this Court. Capstar's reply brief is 
largely are-hash of the same false claim i.e. "At the time Funks purchased the property in 1969, 
the GTC easement road was the only existing road providing access to the Funk's real property." 
The undeniable fact is that Mellick Road provided legal access to the Funk parcel in 
Section 15. This fact is proven by no less than the 1907 Survey and Viewers Report, the Bruce 
Anderson affidavit, the 1959 Metsker map, the District Court's finding in the Loudin v. Stokes 
case, the Brownsberger map, Funk's deposition testimony, and Ms. Weeks own testimony to this 
Court. It clearly goes against statements contained in the Funk and Rook affidavits stating 
otherwise and does raise the question regarding the reliability of those affidavits. 
Both easement theories, an easement by necessity and easement implied by prior use, 
require that the claimant "prove" (among other things) the element of necessity. For an easement 
by necessity, the claimant must prove strict necessity; generally meaning that the parcel is 
completely devoid any legal access. Given the undeniable fact that Funk's land in Section 15 
benefited from the Mellick Road access, this element cannot be established and Capstar's claim 
of an easement by necessity is defeated. 
IMPLIED BY PRIOR USE 
For an easement implied by prior use, the claimant need not prove strict necessity. 
Rather, the claimant only needs to prove something less than strict necessity; generally meaning 
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that acquiring the access would prove either too costly or too difficult. Here too, because Funk's 
land benefited from the Mellick road easement in Section 15, there is no necessity. Simply stated, 
Capstar cannot establish an easement implied by prior use because it cannot establish the element 
of necessity. The Funk parcel benefited from the Mellick road easement and therefore, there was 
no element of necessity. 
Capstar attempts to make the argument that because Mellick road didn't extend all the 
way into Funks' Section 22 property or because it needed work, created a necessity for access to 
Funk's Section 22 land. This argument is clearly unsupported by law. Capstar has failed to cite 
any case law that supports the argument that anyone who cannot access a part of their land, can 
take the property of their neighbor for access. There simply is no law that provides that every 
portion of a parcel must have legal access. 
Regardless, the undeniable fact is that there was a logging road that extended from 
Mellick road in Section 15 to Funks land in Section 22. Whether or not that road had become 
overgrown or had passed through Section 21 is clearly irrelevant. Theoretically, even if the 
owner of Section 21 denied Mr. Funk the right to travel on the logging road as it passed through 
Section 21, Mr. Funk could have redirected the road to connect up with Mellick road in his 
Section 15 property. There was nothing that stopped him other than the desire to do it. 
Capstar's argument that the terrain was too steep or too difficult for Mr. Funk to improve 
is unsupported by the evidence and completely without merit. To the contrary, Mr. Mack testifies 
in his affidavit that he improved the old logging road. It certainly did not appear to be too 
difficult or prove to be too costly for him. One has to ask, if Mr. Mack didn't have any trouble 
cleaning out the old logging road, then why would it be too difficult for Mr. Funk? 
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It is undeniable that the logging road did extend from Funk's land in Section 15 to Funk's 
land in Section 22. This fact is supported by Mr. Funk's deposition testimony, the Metsker map, 
and the affidavits of Douglas Lawrence and John Mack. The fact that Mr. Funk elected not to 
clean or maintain the logging road is supported by Mr. Funk's own deposition testimony. Mr. 
Funk cannot create a necessity for his land in Section 22 by electing not to clean and improve his 
Mellick road access. The law in Idaho is clear. "Owner of property cannot create a necessity for 
an easement by his or her own actions". B & J Development and Inv., Inc. v Parsons, 126 Idaho 
504,887 P2d 49 Rehearing Denied (1994). 
Capstar has other problems with their easement implied by prior use claim. First, the 
easement Capstar claims to have existed in 1975 didn't exist. Prior to 1989, the Capstar parcel 
was just part of the larger tract ofland the Funks owned. There simply was no access road to the 
Capstar parcel. In 1975, there was only an access road to the Funk parcel. 
As Mr. Funk testifies, he did not approach the owners of Section 28 for an easement. 
According to Mr. Funk, the twenty or thirty times when he drove to his land, he typically did not 
drive across Section 28. Rather, he drove to a spot (that he identified on a map used at his 
deposition) that was west of the Lawrences' parcel and did not require passing through Section 
28. There can be no doubt that the Funks did use "a portion" of the Apple Blossom Road to 
access their property to the west of the Lawrence parcel. However, the Funks certainly did not 
make use of the Lawrence parcel as Capstar suggests. 
There can also be no doubt that the Funks only made two or three trips to their property 
after 1975 and absolutely no trips after 1981, some eight years prior to the creation of the Capstar 
parcel. Two or three trips over a six year (1975-1981) period across wild, uninhabited and open 
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forest land, and unbeknownst to anyone but themselves, hardly rises to the legal definition of an 
implied prior use. Mr. Funk claims that from 1969 to 1975 he made twenty to thirty trips to his 
property across the land owned by Wilber Mead. In an affidavit offered by Wilber Mead, Mr. 
Mead states that prior to granting the Funks an easement in 1972, the only people he was aware 
of using his road was GTE. If Mr. Mead wasn't aware of the use the Funks made of his land prior 
to 1972, then how would anyone else be aware of the Funks' two or three trips made over a six 
year period. There is simply no evidence that anyone, other than the Funks themselves, even 
knew of such use. Even Rook testifies that he didn't know what road Funk used. 
Prior to 1975, the Funks used the Apple Blossom Road to access a point to the west of the 
Lawrence parcel. After the Funks move to American Falls in 1975, for all practical purposes, the 
Funks use of the Apple Blossom access road terminates. The only established use that the Funks 
made of the Apple Blossom Road is the use they made of the road between the period of 1972 
and 1975 to reach an area that Mr. Funk identified on a map that lays to the west of the Lawrence 
parcel. 
It also needs to be noted that at all times relevant, the Funks were in legal title to all their 
lands in Sections 15, 21 and 22. In order for Capstar to establish the element of necessity they 
claim to have existed in Funks' Section 22 parcel, Capstar would have to establish that the Funks 
conveyed title ownership of the Lawrence parcel in 1975. That simply did not happen. 
FUNK/HUMAN SYNERGISTICS SALE AGREEMENT 
Capstar asserts that the trial court correctly noted that after Funk sold the property to 
Human Synergistics in 1975, he recorded a sales agreement which contained the clause that the 
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parcel was subject to an ingress/egress easement for the benefit of Section 22. And, even though 
this language did not reserve an express easement, it evidenced a claim of right for Funk and 
their successors to use the road for ingress and egress to Section 22. 
The Funk/Human Synergistics land sale agreement was neither a conveyance or any 
claim of rights by its own terms. The Sale Agreement was merely an executory land sale 
agreement to place third parties on notice that the Buyer has a beneficial interest in the land. In 
Capstar v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 152 P3d 575 (2007), this Court agreed: 
"This was a title retaining contract where the grant of the Lawrence parcel (and creation 
of any easement over it) was contingent upon the fulfillment of the sales agreement. The 
document does not disclose any intent to convey any property interest until the balance owning 
on the sales agreement was paid." 
Being that the sales agreement was not a conveyance as Capstar claims, the Funks 
retained title ownership in the property until they actually conveyed the title in 1992. Therefore, 
whatever use Capstar claims the Funks made of the Lawrence property prior to 1992, could not 
be considered a prescriptive use. One simply cannot create a prescriptive use over the lands they 
own. The trial court was in error when it ruled that: "The use Capstar seeks is no different than 
the prescriptive use Funks made of the Lawrences' land for that six year period from 1969 to 
1975." [R. 35120 v. 3 p. 575] 
Capstar initially claimed that the "subject to and including language" of the Sales 
Agreement amounted to a reservation of an easement. And, this was the finding of the trial court 
on our first appeal [R. 32090 p.83]. This Court simply disagreed with trial court's finding 
concluding: 
"There is nothing in the sale agreement that indicates an immediate grant of 
easement rights ... The sale agreement therefore does not, by itself, create any 
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easement either by grant, reservation or exception. The district court erred in 
concluding that it did." 
Either the trial court did not read this decision or it simply disagreed with the 
Supreme Court's opinion. The trial court made it obviously clear, it thought otherwise: 
"Funks actually did take great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he 
sold to Human Synergistics in 1975; however, they errantly put that language in 
the sale agreement. That is why there is no express easement." [R. 35120 v. 3 p. 
569] 
The undeniable fact is that the subject to and including language in the sales agreement 
was simply declaring that the parcel being sold was subject to an easement that had been 
previously granted to GTE in 1966 and it also included an easement (appurtenant) that the Funks 
acquired across the property owned by Wilber Mead in 1972. This fact was supported by the 
1998 writing Harold Funk offered by the Lawrences, as well as the 1966 GTE warranty deed, the 
1972 Mead/Funk easement, and the 2007 Supreme Court opinion in Capstar. 
After this Court remanded this case back in 2007, Capstar invents a new argument for the 
sales agreement; claiming that while the language did not reserve an easement, it did evidence a 
claim of right for Funk and their successors to use the road for ingress and egress to Section 22. 
This argument is simply disingenuous and without merit. It was a product created to fill a void in 
their prescriptive easement claim. The void that involves the element of notice. Capstar simply 
has not produced any evidence that supports the notice element that's required for a prescriptive 
easement claim. Because there is no evidence, they attempted to invent it. Capstar never really 
explains how the language creates a claim or points to the exact wording that creates the claim. 
They just suggest that it does and the trial court was ever too eager to go along. 
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FARMANIANIMACK EASEMENT 
Capstar argues that Lawrences' predecessor in title "Farmanian," immediately prior to 
signing the Lawrence sale agreement, entered into a grant of easement and quit claim deed with 
John Mack. As Capstar argues, in that writing, Farmanian and Mack recognizes the GTC 
easement road (as it crosses the Farmanian parcel) as the historical access road being used by 
Funk and his successor Mack. However, Capstar offers no other evidence of any kind to support 
this claim, nothing from the Farmanians and nothing from Mack. And, as the record abundantly 
shows, the Farmanians would have absolutely no first hand knowledge of the Funks use of the 
road. 
The Farmanians' interest in the Lawrence parcel begins on June 28, 1996 when National 
Associated Properties conveys to them a Warranty Deed and ends just three months later when 
on October 1, 1996, the Farmanians convey a warranty deed to the Lawrences. There is 
absolutely nothing in the record that reveals the Farmanians having any interest in the Lawrence 
property prior to June 28, 1996. 
Funk testifies that he only made two to three trips to his property after 1975 and made 
absolutely no trips after 1981, a full fifteen years before the F armanians take an interest in the 
property. It simply is not possible for the Farmanians to know what road(s) the Funks used or 
even what part of their property the Funks visited. There simply is no evidence in the record of 
the Farmanians ever visiting the property, actually witnessing anyone using the road, or even 
knowing any of the history of the property. And, they certainly cannot testify to anyone's use of 
the road prior to 1996. 
- 18-
ROOK AFFIDAVIT 
Capstar argues that there is no indication in the record that the medication Mr. Rook was 
on when he signed his affidavit, affected Mr. Rook's ability to perceive and understand what he 
was doing when he signed the affidavit in 2004. Capstar further attempts to minimize the 
medication issue by making the unsupported claim that the medication only affected his ability 
to recall the period of time after he signed the affidavit, which is not what Mr. Rook testifies to. 
During deposition, Mr. Rook was asked by J.P. Whelan "Now, can you tell me, how did 
this affidavit come into being? Was it prepared by Susan Weeks?" Rook's answer "You know, / 
don't even recall it." [RD (Rook Deposition) 47:21-24, R. 35120 v.2 p.412] A few moments later 
Mr. Rook is asked "And do you think you read this before you signed it? " His answer, 
"probably." [RD 48:16-18] Meaning, Mr. Rook can't even testify to the fact that he even read the 
affidavit before he signed it or even knew what the affidavit contained. Mr. Rook explains why 
he doesn't remember the affidavit. At the time he signed it, he was on some "pretty strong 
medication" [RD 48:4] for a heart attack and offers "/ don't recall much of anything during this 
period that / had my heart attack. " [RD 48:7-9] 
Mr. Rook's deposition notice required that Mr. Rook produce documentation for his 
deposition. When Mr. Rook arrived at his deposition, he was asked for this documentation, he 
produced nothing. According to Mr. Rook, about four years earlier, he had tossed every single 
thing that had to do with his radio and broadcast career out. [RD 5:8-10] He kept absolutely no 
paperwork of any kind relating to the radio station. He certainly didn't bring a copy of the 
affidavit he signed. 
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Regarding the affidavit, Mr. Rook said "he didn't recall it" meaning, he doesn't have any 
recollection of it at all. Having no recollection implies that he cannot testify to anything 
contained in the affidavit. He simply doesn't know whats it says or what it contains. Obviously, 
the medication Mr. Rook was on at the time he signed his affidavit affected his mental capacities. 
He testifies that he doesn't recall much from the period that he had his heart attack and really 
points to the medication as the cause. 
The real purpose of depositions are to get to the facts of what an individual knows and 
what an individual can testify to. The fact of the matter is: Rook does not testify that he read the 
affidavit; does not testify that he is aware of its contents; does not testify that he understood what 
he was signing when he signed it. And, when asked what he knew about specific statements 
made in his affidavit, he could not validate those statements. For example: Mr. Rook's affidavit 
contained this statement in paragraph 4 "The existing private road was visible and in use by 
Funks at the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel" When asked about this statement 
Mr. Rook replied "How do I know it was Mr. Funk's access? I have no - - I wouldn't. I can only 
say that thats the one road that I used or that my station used going in and out of that place over 
all the time we owned it was that one road." [RD 52:24 - 53:3] A few moments later, Mr. Rook 
was asked: "How do you know that the Funks were using that road at the time Kootenai 
Broadcasting purchased its parcel?" His answer, "The only thing - the only answer to that is 
that thats what Bill Gott would have told us was - whether Funks used it, I don't know whether_ 
Funks had been up that hill before. I'd never met the man. "[RD 56:24 - 57:5] 
Here, Mr. Rook's deposition testimony completely contradicts the statement( s) offered in 
his affidavit. Yet, the trial court completely ignores what Mr. Rook said regarding this in his 
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deposition. The trial court writes "John Rook corroborates Harold Funk, but does so at a later 
time in 1989 when Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its land Rook testified in his qffidavit 
that in 1989 the private access road was the only road that provided access to the Funk's parcels 
in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 3 ,-r,-r 4, 6. [R. 35120 p. 586] 
The trial court either didn't review Mr. Rook's deposition testimony, just dismissed it, or 
had other motives for citing his affidavit testimony and not citing his deposition testimony. 
Clearly, there are obvious conflicts between his affidavit and his deposition that the trial court 
didn't resolve in its written decision. Because of the conflicts in his testimony and the fact Mr. 
Rook cannot testify to anything in his affidavit, the trial court should have completely impeached 
the Rook affidavit and therefore the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the affidavit 
testimony. 
PREJUDGMENT ACCESS TO THE LAWRENCE LAND 
One of the issues raised in their opening brief was whether or not the trial court abused 
its discretion by granting Capstar prejudgment access to the Lawrence parcel, without the 
application of a TRO, Preliminary Injunction, or the taking of a bond. This issue refers to a 
hearing that was held on October 29,2007 in which Capstar filed an application for access across 
the Lawrence parcel. [HT (Hearing Transcript) 119:1-131:3] 
This application was filed with the trial court together with a motion to shorten time, just 
three days before the hearing was held. With only three days notice, the Lawrences were unable 
to file a reply brief. 
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The Lawrences objected to the motion to shorten time on the grounds that the motion did 
not cite a rule, nor did it state a reason to shorten time, nor did it have an affidavit in support. The 
Lawrences also objected to the application for access on the grounds that there was no rule cited, 
no affidavit in support, no injunction or TRO in place, and no bond in place. The Lawrences also 
argued that when the trial court issued a permanent injunction, the permanent injunction 
superseded the preliminary injunction, resulting in the exoneration of the bond Capstar posted for 
the preliminary injunction. Then, when the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the decision that 
created the permanent injunction, that it only stands to reason that the permanent injunction 
would not be left in place. Therefore, having no preliminary injunction in place and no 
permanent injunction in place, before the trail court could grant access to Capstar, Capstar would 
necessarily have to apply for a TRO or preliminary il1iunction and post another bond. The 
Lawrences' objections were summarily over ruled and the trial court granted Capstar access. 
Capstar offered absolutely no argument or response regarding this issue in their reply brief. 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
Capstar acknowledges on reply that the Lawrences correctly noted that the trial court 
made an error regarding the prescriptive period as applied to Funk. Capstar then goes on to argue 
that the trial court evidently became confused regarding the dates. And, that this defect in the 
Court's analysis regarding the time period of Funk's use does not invalidate the trail court's 
finding that there was a prescriptive easement established over the property. Because, according 
to Capstar, the record shows that the Funks made two or three trips to the property between the 
six year period of 1975 and 1981. 
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As discussed earlier at some length, the Funks retained legal title to the Lawrence parcel 
until the year 1992. Because the Funks were in still title to the property from the years 1975 -
1981, the Funk's use of their own property could never have ripened into a prescriptive use. 
Capstar completely ignores this fact. 
Also, Capstar seemingly ignores the fact that the Funks completely abandoned their use 
of the road after 1981. For the eight year period immediately preceding the creation of the 
Capstar parcel, the Funks make not a single use of the road. The Lawrences will argue, that the 
trial court also erred by not considering this fact. One of the elements required to establish an 
easement by prescription is that the use of the easement is "continuous and uninterrupted" for the 
statutory period. What the Funks testify to is that over a six year period, they made roughly two 
or three trips - then completely abandoned the use of the road. It is certainly hard to understand 
how two or three uses over a six year period rises to the level of "continuous and uninterrupted." 
It is even more difficult to understand how the trial court could conclude that an eight year 
absence is not an uninterrupted use. 
The statutory period for the present action is five years. In effect, the Funks abandoned 
their use of the road for three years more than the required statutory period. Therefore, whatever 
claims over the road the trial court concluded the Funks acquired, the trial court should have also 
concluded that they were extinguished through abandonment. It only stands to reason, that if the 
use of a road for the prescriptive period can benefit the dominant estate, then non-use of a road 
for the same prescriptive period should benefit the servient estate. It doesn't make equitable sense 
that rights only accrue in favor of the dominant estate and never in favor ofthe servient estate. 
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Capstar also argues on reply that the origin of the easement is known. According to 
Capstar, it commenced on the purchase of the Funk property and continued after severance. 
In Hughes v. Fisher, 124 Idaho 474,129 P3d 1223 (2006), this Court reiterated the 
general rule that the regular crossing of another's property was presumed to be adverse with the 
exception where a landowner constructed a way over his land for his use and convenience, the 
mere use of it by others that doesn't interfere with his use will be presumed permissive. Capstar 
then goes on to argue that the trial court had no basis to presume Funks use of the road was 
permissive because there is no evidence that Lawrence or his predecessor constructed the road. 
This assertion clearly goes against the all evidence in this record and what Capstar has been 
testifying to all along. In its Memorandum in Support of Renewed Summary Judgment [R. 35120 
v.l p. 20] Capstar acknowledges that they do not know who built the road " When the road 
providing access to the Funk's Section 21 and Section 22 parcels was established is unknown." 
Capstar also acknowledges that the road was there prior to the Funks taking title to their land. [R. 
35120 v.l p. 13] 'The private road used by GTe, Funk, and Rook was the only existing road 
that provided access to the parcels at the time that Funks purchased the property. " The 1959 
Metsker map clearly shows the road as having existed as early as 1959, some seven years prior to 
GTC acquiring easement rights and building a tower site. The evidence also shows that this road 
was in existence when GTC acquired easement rights. Exhibits 2 and 3 are copies of the 
easements GTC acquired from Blossom and Ulrich which state in part: 
"Grantee is granted the right to make all necessary improvements and minor 
relocation on the present road site in order to facilitate moving its equipment and 
machines to and from the site of said microwave tower." 
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It is clearly undisputed that the road existed prior to GTC acquiring easement rights in 
1966. The trial court should have concluded, lacking evidence to the contrary, that the road was 
built as early as 1959 and for the specific use and convenience of owners at that time. As this 
Court noted in Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P2d 975, 979 (1997) 
"Use of a driveway in common with the owner and the general public, in the 
absence of some decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate and exclusive 
use on his part, negates any presumption of individual right there in his favor." 
Therefore, the trial court should have directed its inquiry towards a decisive act that 
constituted some actual invasion or infringement of the rights of the owner of the servient 
property in order to determine if the use amounted to an adverse use. Schultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 
770, 554 P2d 948 (1976). There is absolutely no evidence in the record that indicates any 
decisive act on the part of Funk or Rook that would constitute an actual infringement of rights. 
On the contrary, both Funk's and Rook's deposition testimony evidences just the opposite. Both 
testify that they were given keys to the gate. Both testified that they believed they had permission 
to use the road. And, neither testified that they used the road adversely to anyone's rights or 
under any claim of right. 
To establish an easement by prescription, the claimant must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence the following elements: 1) open and notorious; 2) continuous and 
uninterrupted; 3) adverse and with a claim of right; 4) with an actual or implied knowledge of the 
owner of the servient tenement; 5) for the statutory period. To establish an easement by 
prescription, a party must establish by clear and convincing evidence of all of the elements 
necessary for a prescriptive easement. 
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The Lawrences contend that not only has Capstar failed to provide clear and convincing 
evidence supporting all of the elements required for a prescriptive use, they simply cannot prove 
anyone element. There simply is no evidence to support Capstar's prescriptive use claim. 
Capstar has simply failed to establish a Prima Facie case. 
DISQUALIFICATION 
Two of the issues the Lawrences raise on appeal is whether or not the trial court abused 
its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself for cause and whether or not the trial court abused its 
discretion by conducting an independent investigation. In support of these issues, the Lawrences 
establish twelve facts that they believe would certainly give cause to question the trial court's 
impartiality. 
In its reply brief, Capstar devotes a single page in response, portraying the Lawrences as 
doing nothing more than taking umbrage with the trial court's rulings that the Lawrences 
disagree with. Capstar does not provide any argument regarding the twelve facts the Lawrences 
raise in their opening brief. Capstar simply glosses over the issues by ignoring the facts. Yes, the 
Lawrences do take umbrage with the trial court's ruling. The Lawrences have been fighting this 
litigation for nine years. In defense of this litigation, the Lawrences have taken depositions, 
acquired affidavits, searched court and county records, and have produced a body of evidence 
that clearly goes against Capstar's claims. All, for it to be simply dismissed by the trial court. It is 
simply too hard to rationalize how the trial court can simply ignore all the rebuttal evidence in 
this case. How could the trial court ignore the fact that Mellick road entered the Funk's land in 
Section 15? How could the trial court ignore the fact that the Funks were in legal title to the land 
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they supposedly prescribed an easement across? How could the trial court so misinterpret the 
directives of the Idaho Supreme Court on remand? 
There can only be one of two answers. Either the trial court is completely incompetent or 
the trial court was simply going to find a way, any way, to rule in favor of Capstar and Tower. 
The Lawrences, no doubt, believes the latter. 
FACT 1. The trial court made a significant number of errors in materialfacts. Because 
this issue was discussed at length in the Appellant's opening brief under a discussion of the 
evidence, the Appellants won't belabor the issue by reviewing the errors. But the fact is the trial 
court made at least twenty-four errors in findings of fact and each and every error was used to 
support a ruling in favor of the Respondents. And, they were not harmless errors as Capstar 
portrays, but fundamental errors. 
FACT 2. The trial court's clearly erroneous and contradictory findings made in the 2004 
summary judgments for Tower and Capstar and denying Lawrences' timely motionfor an 
extension of time to finish discovery prior to a summary judgment hearing. Initially in Capstar, 
the Appellants were Pro Se. A hearing was held on Capstar's motion for summary judgment. 
Prior to the hearing, the Lawrences filed a timely motion to move the court to provide an 
enlargement of time because Capstar had not provided timely answers to defendants admissions, 
interrogatories, and demand for production. Furthermore, the answers Capstar did provide were 
vague and questionable. Rather than grant an enlargement of time to allow the Lawrences ample 
time to dispute the facts, the court just ruled on the issue of an express easement. The Lawrences 
presented good rebuttal facts concerning the express easement theory, all of which were 
summarily dismissed by the court with a total disregard to Lawrences' arguments. The court 
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granted summary judgment in favor of Capstar, in part by repeatedly finding that the sales 
agreement and deed were clear and unambiguous. 
Facing a similar upcoming hearing on Tower's motion for summary judgment, the 
Lawrences retained John P. Whelan who represented them at hearing. Mr. Whelan explained to 
the court the doctrine of merger and presented good arguments against Tower's express easement 
theories. Lawrences' arguments were again, summarily overruled. The court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Tower, this time finding the deed to be ambiguous. The basic tenets of stare 
decisis dictate that the law shall be consistent and applied in an even handed and predictable 
way. Due process of law would seemingly require a similar result. Yet, in the present matter, the 
trial court reached seemingly arbitrary and capricious results. The Lawrences appealed both 
decisions and on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found in favor of the Lawrences, reversing the 
court's order and remanding it back for further proceedings. In a footnote in the Tower opinion, 
the Idaho Supreme Court even questions how the trial court could conclude the deed to be 
ambiguous in one case and unambiguous in another. 
FACT 3. Confining the initial summary judgment ruling on the express easement theory 
alone. Obviously, the trial court would have had a harder time justifying the findings of a 
prescriptive easement and implied easement, together in the same decision, with a finding of an 
express easement. It is entirely reasonable for the Appellants to question whether the trail court 
was attempting to offer the Respondents their best shot at all their easement theories by 
disassociating the finding of an express easement from findings on the other easement theories. 
While this issue was not raised by the Appellants on their first appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Tower noted in part: Final resolution o/this case would have been expedited, had the district 
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court not confined its inquiry to the express easement issue .... By confining its consideration to 
the express easement issue, justice in this case has been delayed 
FACT 4. Summarily ruling infavor of the Respondents on each and every easement 
theory they put before the court and ultimately ruling in their favor on their express easement, 
easement by necessity, easement by implication by prior use, and prescriptive easement theories. 
The Lawrences are being sued by both Tower and Capstar over each and every easement theory 
recognized by law and over the course of these proceedings, the trial court has determined that 
both Tower (or Tower's landlord who is not a party to this case) and Capstar have express 
easements, implied easements by prior use, easements by necessity, and prescriptive easements 
across the Appellants land. It begs the question, how could the trial court possibly find, in a 
summary judgment ruling, that ALL the legal elements necessary to establish ALL the various 
easement theories were present in essentially the Funk/Human Synergistics sales agreement, the 
Funk affidavit, and either the Rook or the Hall affidavit? And, it raises a host of other questions 
and issues: How can a party have an express easement AND an easement by necessity AND an 
easement by implication AND a prescriptive easement over another party's land? How could a 
party's use of an express or implied easement ripen into a prescriptive use? How could the 
element of necessity be satisfied if an express easement exists? While Funk sold the now 
Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics in 1975 under a real estate contract, the title didn't 
convey to Human Synergistics until 1992. How could Funk create a prescriptive right across the 
land he was in title to at the time? How could there exist an easement to the Capstar's parcel in 
1975, when Capstar's parcel wasn't created until 1989? Even on the surface, the ruling appears 
not to be a well thought out, well reasoned finding of fact and conclusion oflaw. It reads more 
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like a shot-gun blast where the lower court is just going to find reasons to rule in favor of the 
Respondents. It is entirely reasonable for the Appellants to question whether the trail court was 
attempting to offer the Respondents their best shot at all their easement theories. 
FACT 5. Seemingly dismissing and/or ignoring the summary judgment rebuttal evidence 
the Lawrences' put before the court. Again, because this issue was raised earlier in this brief, the 
Appellants will not belabor the point other than to list it among those facts that the Appellants 
point to as why the court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 
FACT 6. The trail court's final judgment that the plaintiflltenantllessee (of Hall) has an 
easement by prescription, an easement implied by prior use. and an easement by necessity. At 
summary judgment in Tower, the Appellants argued that on first appeal in Tower, the Idaho 
Supreme Court established that title ownership is a prerequisite to quiet title an easement 
appurtenant in favor of a dominant estate. Furthermore, that Hall, who is not a party to this suit is 
the record owner of the dominant estate and as a result, Tower lacks standing to seek quiet title 
declaration in its favor. In its memorandum and decision, the trial court argues that the 
Appellants assertions (in Tower) that Tower lacks standing to pursue easement theories of 
implication or necessity is without merit and as a result, grants partial summary judgment in 
favor of Tower and declares that the plaintiff/tenant/lessee has easements by prescription, 
implication, and necessity. 
Not only was the quiet titling of an easement in favor of the tenant wrong, it seemingly 
contradicts the trial court's own reasoning in its memorandum and decision when the court states 
"the only issue remanded by the appellate court in this case was whether Tower Asset, as a 
tenant, has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement of its landlord, 
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Halls ... .In the Tower Asset case, Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to iJ?junctive relief, as 
their landlords, the Halls, have an easement over Lawrences land established by prior use, by 
necessity and by prescription. .. " Clearly, the trial court was going to find any reason whatsoever 
to grant Tower an easement across the Appellant's land. And, it is obvious that the trial court did 
not read the directions ofIdaho Supreme Court on remand or most likely, the trial court simply 
rejected it. It is entirely reasonable for the Appellants to question the court's impartiality 
whenever the trial court so clearly disobeys the decisions and directives of the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
FACT 7. The continued refusal by the court to disqualifY itselffor cause. On June 6, 
2007, the Lawrences properly file a motion for disqualification for cause together with the 
affidavit of John P. Whelan and the motion was heard on June 13,2007. The affidavit and oral 
argument offered facts surrounding Yovichin v. Bush, CV-O 1-2116; a case involving both the 
court and the Appellant's attorney John P. Whelan and in which the court disqualified himself for 
unexplained reasons. Also offered were facts surrounding Sauls v. Luchi, CV-04-1616; Straub v. 
Smith, CV-04-5437 (Supreme Court No. 31955); Krivor v. Rogers, CV-06-6252; and 
Metropolitan Property & Causality v. Allen, CV-06-6358; all cases in which the Appellant's 
attorney believed establishes facts that demonstrates a particular bias the court has against Mr. 
Whelan and Mr. Whelan's representation of the Appellants. 
Rather than determine the legal sufficiency of the motion for disqualification at the 
hearing, the court simply withheld judgment and adjured "to take a closer look." On June 27, 
2007, the court published a rather detailed written decision in which the court simply refutes 
each and every fact or charge raised by the Appellant's attorney. In its memorandum of decision, 
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the only rational the court really gives for not disqualifying itself, is an argument that the court 
harbors no bias towards the Lawrences or their attorney. It certainly offered nothing that would 
convince the Lawrences of the court's impartiality. The memorandum and decision was simply 
nothing more than the trial court's attempt to defend it's interest in this case. In determining 
whether a trial judge should be disqualified, inquiry is not only whether there was an actual bias 
on judge's part, but also whether judge's conduct or words created "such likelihood of bias or an 
appearance of bias that judge was unable to hold balance between vindicating interest of court 
and interest of accused. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14. State v. Garza, 865 P2d 463, 125 Or. App. 
385, review denied 876 P2d 783, 319 Or. 81 
Clearly, a truly impartial court would be absolutely impartial as to whether or not it was 
the finder and trier of fact. It has no personal interest in the matter at all. It has no motive, no 
rational, and no reason to be involved other than the administration of justice. Because the 
courts are the only institution in this country that the citizenry can tum to for the administration 
of justice, the court has to be exceedingly mindful, not only of its role, but also of its appearance. 
A truly impartial court would conclude that the appearance of justice is such an essential 
component of justice, that without it, justice cannot be served and for the sake of justice alone, 
the court has no other choice but to recuse itself. Even in the case in which a judge may be 
convinced of his or her own impartiality, the appearance of bias or prejudice can so undermine 
litigants confidence in proceeding or public's confidence in system as to require judges 
disqualification. Comiskey v. District Court In and For the County of Pueblo 926 P2d 539, 
Rehearing denied 
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It can be also argued that a court that it is unwilling to recluse itself, can no longer claim 
that is it truly impartial. Once the court defends its reasoning and rationale for refusing to recuse 
itself, it creates a self interest or personal stake in the matter and can no longer hold the balance 
between vindicating its interest and the interest of the party asserting impartiality. The court 
unconsciously becomes tainted in defending its role. In the present matter, the fact that the court 
put so much time and energy into refuting the facts raised by the Appellants' attorney and 
defending itself is a clear indicator that the court is no longer impartial. It clearly demonstrates 
that the trial court has a personal stake in the proceedings that it wishes to defend. In Price v. 
Featherson, 64 Idaho 312, 130 P2d 853, this court states "The truth of the filed affidavit 
charging bias or prejudice on the part of the judge is not what disqualifies the judge, but the 
affidavit itself" Supporting the notion that the appearance of bias or prejudice so undermines the 
confidence citizens have in the court as to render its administration of justice in a matter 
illegitimate. The commentary to Canon 1 (Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct) furthers this in part: 
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct 
by judges. Ajudge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A 
judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. Ajudge must 
therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as 
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. The 
prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety 
applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. Because it is not 
practicable to list all prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general 
terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically 
mentioned in the Code. Actual improprieties under this standard include violations 
of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this Code. The test for violation 
of this Canon is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a 
perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with 
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired. [Emphasis added] 
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FACT 8. The court conducted an independent investigation in to the case of the Estate of 
Diane Rothe. Again, returning to Mr. Whelan's June 13, 2007 affidavit regarding Yovichin v. 
Bush, CVO 1 2116, Mr. Whelan raises questions surrounding the court's voluntary disqualification 
in that case [R. 35120 v.l p.98-100] and questions whether the reasons the court voluntarily 
disqualified itself from that case, still exists today. In the court's memorandum and decision, the 
court speculates that a more likely reason the court voluntarily disqualified itself in Yovichin, 
rnay have dealt with the facts surrounding the Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe, Kootenai 
County Case No. SP 675. The court acknowledges that it reviewed the court file in that case. [R 
35120 v.l p.072] The Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe was not part of the Appellant's 
briefing, testimony, or oral argument. There was no evidence before the court relating to the 
Estate of Dianne Rothe. Rather, the court conducted an independent investigation of the motion 
before the court, produced findings regarding that investigation, and rendered those findings in 
support of the courts decision to deny Appellants motion. Beyond the fact that it was improper 
for the court to look outside the record in reaching a decision and to offer speculation rather than 
fact. The independent fact finding clearly illustrates the extent to which the trial court was 
compelled to reach in order to vindicate its interest in this case. 
The Court's response to Mr. Whelan at hearing, that the Court simply wanted to figure out 
what was in the Court's mind back when the Court disqualified itself in Yovichin appears to be 
sincere and likely an honest mistake. However, regardless of how good the intentions may have 
been, they still don't justify the fact that the court looked outside the record to investigate facts 
relevant to a motion and an issue specifically before the court. What is more troubling is the fact 
that the court defends and justifies its actions by implying that the Court is not restrained from 
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looking outside the record, so long as it doesn't involve the central issue in the case, i.e., the 
easement issue. [HT 49:8-11] The court's position on this issue certainly doesn't appear to be 
consistent with the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct. The commentary to Canon 3 (Idaho Code of 
Judicial Conduct) specifically states: "Ajudge must not independently investigate facts in a case 
and must consider only the evidence presented." The commentary to Canon 3 certainly doesn't 
appear to provide exceptions to the rule, nor did the trial court cite an authority. The Appellants 
will argue that the Court's position regarding this issue is arbitrary and not supported by law. 
Therefore, it is entirely reasonable for the Appellants to question the Court's impartiality. 
FACT 9. The court is a personal friend of a senior partner in the law practice 
representing the Respondents and that same law practice was the second highest campaign 
contributor the the judge's re-election campaign. The Appellants also offer the fact that the 
attorney for both Capstar and Tower, Susan Weeks, is a law partner of Leander James, a personal 
friend of the court which the court affirms in its decision. [R35120 v.l p. 78] 
The commentary on Canon 5 (Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct) also states that campaign 
contributions, of which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or others who appear before the 
judge may be relevant to disqualification under Section 3E. At the June 13, 2007 hearing on the 
Appellant's motion for Disqualification [HT 15 :20 -16:3], the Appellant's attorney offered 
evidence obtained through the Sunshine law disclosure that Ms. Week's law firm was also the 
second highest contributor to the judge's re-election campaign. It is entirely reasonable for the 
Appellants to question whether or not this judge was influenced in part, either by his personal 
relationship with a partner in the opposing law firm, or by that firm's contribution to his re-
election campaign. 
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FACT 10. The trial court accusing the Lawrence's attorney for not being truthful to the 
court regarding the preliminary injunction. On October 31, 2007, a hearing was held in the 
present case. Capstar moved for a motion to shorten time and application of a sixth access. At 
hearing, many issues were raised by John Whelan, specifically with regards to the motion 
including the lack of a supporting affidavit, failure to cite a rule, the lack of a bond posting, and 
in particular, the lack of a preliminary injunction order.[HT 123:2-125:6] Mr. Whelan argued that 
there was no preliminary injunction outstanding. That the preliminary injunction was superseded 
by a permanent injunction when the court granted summary judgment and which also resulted in 
the bond being exonerated back to Capstar. Later, when the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the 
district courts summary judgment and remanded the case back, that the permanent injunction was 
overturned. At no time did Mr. Whelan say that the Supreme Court overturned the Preliminary 
Injunction. Prior to making a ruling, the court recessed to review the language of the Supreme 
Court opinion and upon its return, the court accused Mr. Whelan for not being truthful to the 
court [HT 129:23-25] in making a claim that the preliminary injunction was reversed. The 
transcript of that hearing speaks for itself. The trial court completely misconstrued what Mr. 
Whelan stated and was in err in accusing Mr. Whelan of not being truthful to the court. The 
court's response to Mr. Whelan illustrates that the court does not believe Mr. Whelan to be 
credible or truthful and can be indicative of an underlying current of animosity and/or contempt 
either against the Appellants or Mr. Whelan. 
FACT 11. The trial court granting Capstar prejudgment access across the Lawrence 
parcel on only three days notice, without an injunction in place, without an affidavit in support 
of the motion, without a motion that cites a rule, without the posting of a bond and without an 
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application/or a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. Referring back to the 
October 31, 2007 hearing in which Capstar sought an access across the Lawrence parcel, the 
court granted Capstar access to the Lawrence parcel over the Appellant's objections regarding the 
lack of statutory notice, the lack of an affidavit, the lack of a rule cited in the motion, the lack of 
an injunction in place, and the fact that there was no bond posted. [HT 123:3- 125:7] 
FACT 12. The complete disparity in the admittance o/the Respondents affidavit 
testimony as compared to the striking 0/ the Appellant's affidavit testimony The trial court 
seemingly appeared to use a double standard in regards to the admission of affidavit testimony. 
The affidavits produced by Tower and Capstar, specifically the Rook, Hall, and Funk affidavits 
were all drafted and prepared by Tower and Capstar's legal counsel and subsequently sent to the 
affiant(s) to sign. Because they were drafted by legal counsel, they were not the words ofthe 
affiant, but the words of the attorney drafting them. John Rook testified in deposition that he not 
only didn't remember providing an affidavit, but that at the time he signed it, he was under heavy 
medication for medical reasons. Clearly, these statements alone completely impeached his 
affidavit (or should have). It is likewise obvious from Harold Funk's deposition, that Harold 
Funk did not understand the affidavit he was signing as his deposition testimony is not in 
alignment with his affidavit testimony. Because the Lawrences were unable to serve Robert Hall 
(after six attempts) to take his deposition, the Lawrences are left with unanswered questions 
regarding the facts Robert Hall can and will actually testify to. 
On July 24, 2007, Appellant Douglas Lawrence submitted a twenty-six page affidavit [R. 
35120 v.2 p. 146-292] in opposition to the Respondent's motion for summary judgment. Attached 
to this affidavit were an additional 121 pages of exhibits in support of the facts Mr. Lawrence 
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establishes in his affidavit. Those exhibits include (A) a certified copy of a 1907 Viewer's Report 
and Road Survey; (B & C) a court order and summary judgment signed by Judge Gary Haman in 
Case No. 65077; (D) the affidavit of Bruce Anderson, County Surveyor for Kootenai County; (E) 
a portion of a 1959 Metsker Map (the complete 1959 Metsker Map was made part of the record 
in 2004); (F) satellite imagery as produced by the Google Earth computer program illustrating 
the roads on Blossom Mountain and the places whereby the photography in Exhibit G were 
taken; (G) photography of the road taken by the Appellant; (H) various police reports; (I) the 
Nextel License agreement; (J-P) various documents; (Q) Great Northern Broadcasting License 
Agreement; (R-S) admissions and an invoice; (T) affidavit of Wilber Mead; (V) Kootenai Cable 
Lease Agreement; (W) Trinity Broadcast/John Rook Letter and lease agreement. 
The Appellants are not attorneys and did not receive any direction, guidance, or 
suggestions from their attorney in producing that affidavit. And, they were not familiar with a lot 
of the legal concepts regarding affidavits. However, the words in that affidavit are the affiant 
own words and not the product of an attorney inventing or sculpting facts that best serve their 
interest and cannot be unsubstantiated by the record in this case. As testified to by the 
Appellant's exhibits, the Appellant has performed a lot of research on this road and simply set 
forth the facts the Appellant uncovered in research. And, in support of those facts, the Appellant 
attached 121 pages of supporting exhibits. 
In Hook v. Horner, 95 Idaho 657,517 P2d 554 (1973), this Court ruled that "A 
landowner is a competent witness to the location of the boundaries of his own land if they are 
within his personal knowledge, and may testifY to the same. His interest in the outcome of the 
litigation would affect the weight to be given to his testimony, but not its admissibility." Clearly, 
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the Appellants have spent many hours walking the properties on Blossom Mountain; many hours 
reviewing historical county and court records, deeds, titles, and easements; and spent time 
consulting with surveyors and other property owners. The exhibits themselves testify to that fact. 
The Respondents moved the trial court to strike all the relevant portions of the 
Appellant's affidavit testimony and was entirely successful at getting the trial court to strike 
complete paragraphs over foundation, argument, or some other technicality. Much of the 
Respondent's motion doesn't even identify the words or phrases that created the technicality. The 
motion simply identifies a paragraph and moves that it should be stricken because it contains 
argument. The foundational issues in particular, should have been overruled as there were 
exhibits in support of the facts and court needed to look no further than the exhibits or the record 
itself for the foundation. While it would have been proper for the trial court to "weigh" the 
Lawrences testimony; it was improper for the court to strike it from the record. 
Yet, even though the exhibits themselves were admitted, the trial court either ignored 
them or discounted them. In its memorandum and decision, the trial court cites the exact 
testimony it relies on in rendering its decision. The trial court cites Susan Week's affidavit 
twenty-seven times to establish the chains of title in the respective properties; the Rook affidavit 
six times; the Funk affidavit ten times; the Wenkler affidavit once; the Brownsberger affidavit 
twice; and the Rebor affidavit thrice. As far as the defense's testimony, the trial court cites the 
Lawrence affidavit four times; the Mack affidavit twice; the Anderson affidavit once; the Funk 
deposition thrice; and the Loudin v. Stokes case once. However, each time the court cited the 
defense's testimony, it did so only to use it against the defense. 
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It also seems somewhat egregious to strike a whole paragraph of testimony simply 
because the paragraph may contain some argument. The motions should have been overruled due 
to the fact the Respondent(s) failed to cite the words or phrases creating the argument. 
The Appellants also moved the court to strike portions of the Hall, Rook, and Funk 
affidavit. And, in stark contrast to the Respondent's motions to strike, the Appellant's motion laid 
out the specific words and phrases in each paragraph that created the foundational or other 
problem with the statement. However, the Appellants were only successful at getting what 
amounts to a total of five words stricken from the Rook affidavit. 
In a summary judgment ruling, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor 
of the opposing party. In the present matter, the trial court simply ruled each and every fact on 
each and every easement theory presented by Capstar and Tower is uncontradicted. Therefore, 
the court does not have to construe anything in the Appellant's favor and can simply award each 
and every claim to Capstar and Tower. It is so terribly difficult (rather impossible) to rationalize 
how a one hundred and forty-seven page affidavit with one hundred and twenty-one pages of 
exhibits together with eighty-four pages of deposition testimony fails to create a scintilla of 
doubt on anyone fact or issue. The only rational explanation is the that the trail court has turned 
a blind eye and deaf ear towards the Appellant's evidence and the Appellants are entirely 
reasonable to question the court's impartiality. 
Due process, the appearance of fairness, and the Code of Judicial Conduct require 
disqualification of a judge who is biased against a party or whose impartiality may reasonably be 
questioned. CJC 3(D)(1). Woljkill Feed and Fertilizer Corp. v. Martin, 14 P3d 877, 103 
Wash. App. 836. "Bias" requiring change of judge connotes leaning of mind or inclination toward 
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one person over another. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 40.1 (b)(2) Brown v. Avery. 850 P2d 612, 
UYoming 1993. 
In Sherman v. State, 905 P2d 355, 128 Wash.2d 164, reconsideration denied and 
amended, the Washington Supreme Court held that the test for determining whether a judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, such that a judge should be recused, is an objective 
test that assumes that a reasonable person knows and understands all the relevant facts. The 
Appellants will argue: that they are reasonable person(s); they understand the facts of this case; 
and they are capable of rendering an objective test regarding the judge's impartiality. 
The reasonable person is a legal fiction of the common law representing an objective 
standard against which any individual's conduct can be measured. The standard only requires that 
people act similarly to how "a reasonable person under the circumstance" would, as if their 
limitations were themselves circumstances. Factors external to the defendant are always relevant; 
so is the context within which each action is made. It is within these circumstances that the 
determinations and actions of the defendant are to be judged. There are myriad factors that could 
provide inputs into how a person acts; yet the level of care due is always what is reasonable for 
that set of circumstances. 
The Lawrences will argue, that throughout these proceedings, that their actions and 
personal conduct are unblemished and have exceeded what would be reasonable for any other 
person under this set of circumstances. There is absolutely nothing in this record that would 
portray the Lawrences as being anything other than reasonable or given to extremes. The same 
argument can be made for the Lawrences' attorney J.P. Whelan who also was convinced that the 
trial court harbored a bias or prejUdice. As Mr. Whelan explained at hearing: 
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"I have had to consider this issue for a long period of time, great deal of depth, 
and my experience with this court now spans almost six years. This motion is 
made only because this counsel truly believes that after six years of appearances 
before this court that this court has a bias or prejudice against this counsel, a 
personality conflict of sorts ... That bias or prejudice spills over to my 
representation of my clients, and I believe I would be remiss in my duties if I 
didn't make this motion because I believe, for my purpose, that the best thing I 
can do for my client is to try and get them a fair trial." [HT 16:20-18:7] 
There can be no doubt, that Mr. Whelan considered this action for a long period of time 
before initiating the motion and only did so because he was absolutely convinced that his clients 
could not get a fair trial with that court. It would seem entirely reasonable for any attorney, given 
the same circumstances, to resort to the same actions. 
The Appellants' Opening Brief, together with this brief, should be a testimony to this 
Court, that the Lawrences clearly understand all the relevant facts of this case. Their briefs were 
not written by attorneys or paralegals. They were authored by the Appellants themselves, without 
the assistance of anyone. In its reply brief, Capstar offers no argument that the Lawrences do not 
understand the facts of the case. Rather, they just argue that the Lawrences are merely taking 
umbrage with the trial court's adverse decisions. 
Capstar doesn't make any argument nor cite any case law that would preclude a defendant 
from being capable of rendering an objective test regarding the judge's impartiality. The 
Lawrences are capable, both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, of rendering an objective 
test regarding the judge's impartiality. They have correctly identified and argued twelve specific 
facts that they believe demonstrate why the trial court's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned and why the Lawrences believe trial court abused its discretion by failing to recuse 
itself. 
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LATCHES AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
In its reply brief, Capstar argues that it had no need to defend its legal rights to the road 
until the Lawrences began blocking the road. And, because of this, the Lawrences' defense using 
the doctrine of latches and statue of limitations does not apply. Capstar seemingly argues, that 
because no one challenged their use of the road prior to the Lawrences, that they (and their 
predecessors) simply bear no responsibility to legitimize any rights they claim to have on the 
road. They offer no case law in support of this claim; nor does Capstar provide any argument in 
support. 
There can be no doubt that Capstar is now seeking to assert rights they claim goes back 
thirty or more years. As Capstar states on page 44 of their reply brief "The origin of this 
easement is known. It commenced on purchase of the Funk property and continues to this day." 
Throughout these proceedings, Capstar has asserted the claim that when the Funks purchased 
their property, the only road providing access to Funks land is the GTC access road. Capstar 
furthers this claim by relying on the Funk/Human Synergistic Sale Agreement, asserting that the 
subject to and including language was the Funks putting everyone on notice that the Funks were 
claiming a right to use the road. It begs the question, if the Funks and their successors relied on 
this language, then why didn't they attempt to perfect their easement rights earlier? 
As the Montana Supreme Court ruled in Brabender v. Kit Mfg. Co. 174 Mont. 63,568 
P2d 547 (1977), "Latches is negligence in the assertion of a right. It exists when there has been 
an undue delay of such duration or character as to render the enforcement of an asserted right 
inequitable. " There can be no doubt that neither the Funks, nor Capstar, nor Tower, ever asserted 
any rights to the road prior to 2002. 
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Capstar argues that because the Lawrences were able to take the depositions of Funk and 
Rook, that they can't show prejudice. However, when it comes to the Funk/Human Synergistics 
Sale Agreement, Funk's testimony only presents one point of view. In order to challenge Funk's 
affidavit testimony regarding the sale agreement, it would be necessary to get the testimony of 
Human Synergistics so that the trial court could weigh what the real understanding was between 
Funk and Human Synergistics. Due to the lapse of time, the Lawrences could not take the 
testimony of Human Synergistics to challenge Funks affidavit testimony. This certainly did 
prejudice the Lawrences defense. 
Kootenai Broadcasting, Idaho Broadcasting, AGM, and Capstar, all had actual and 
constructive notice of their possible access issues. There is nothing more indicative of a potential 
access problem than having to first pass through someone's private locked gate for ingress/egress 
to your parcel. Funk's successors to the Capstar parcel are all corporations. All are business 
entities who purchased the Capstar parcel as a business asset. All are required to perform due 
diligence. It is simply impossible to understand how each and every business in this chain title 
were not aware that the parcel was devoid of deeded access. Especially, given the fact, that the 
deeds they received did not convey any access rights across the neighboring lands. The warranty 
deed Kootenai Broadcasting received from Harold Funk specifically included a right of way to 
construct a road and right of way for utilities. This language evidences the fact that Mr. Rook had 
contemplated easement rights prior to his purchase of the Capstar parcel. He wanted to make 
sure he had the rights to bring utilities to his parcel and also that he had the rights to build a road 
across the land still retained by Harold Funk. 
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Mr. Funk: testified that he did not approach the owners of the Section 28 parcel for an 
access. He recognized he didn't have an easement across Section 28 and did not have access 
rights to pass on to Mr. Rook. More importantly, Mr. Rook does not testify that he thought he had 
an easement to the county road. Rather, he had permission. The following exchange took place at 
Mr. Rook's deposition: [RD 53:6-22 R. 35210 v. 2 p 413] 
Rook: "there was a ... an access agreement of sorts with GTE, J think, that gave 
us the right to use that road, and J have that in the files, J remember. " 
Whelan: Those are the files that are gone? 
Rook: Yes 
Whelan: Okay. So you think: you had an access agreement with GTE that 
permitted you and your station to use that road for access? 
Rook: Right. 
Whelan: And that's the road that was created by GTE? 
Rook: J don't know who created it. The one that came upfrom Signal Point 
through the gate we mentioned 
Whelan: Okay. And that was a permissive use, they told you to go ahead and use 
that access? 
Rook: Yes 
Clearly, Mr. Rook knew that he did not have legal access to the county road when he 
acquired the parcel from Harold Funk:. Otherwise, he would not have testified that he thought he 
had GTE's permission to use the road. Rook knew he didn't have access when he bought the 
property and did absolutely nothing to attempt to cure his access problems. 
Capstar and its predecessors have simply sat on their hands. Just like they are doing in 
regards to their lack of access across Section 28. There can be no doubt that the Lawrences' 
predecessors, the Johnsons and McHughs, recognized that they did not have legal access across 
Section 28. In 1977, they negotiated an access agreement with Idaho Forest Industries that 
benefits the Lawrence parcel. They recognized the problem with their access and took the 
necessary steps to fix it. To this day, no one in the Capstar chain of title has taken steps to correct 
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this problem with their access. Using Capstar's logic, they wouldn't need to until such time as 
their access gets cut-off. And, this gets to the heart of the latches defense. That Capstar and all its 
predecessors, all had notice and the opportunity to assert their rights, but delayed in asserting 
those rights until after the Lawrences purchase their property. Now, they assert claims that go 
back 30 years or more and place the Lawrences at a disadvantage in defending the claim. 
Capstar's claims are now stale and should be barred due to latches and the statues of limitations. 
ROOKS SCAVENGER INFERENCE 
During his deposition, Mr. Rook relived painful memories of how Capstar (Clear 
Channel) [RD 45:14-15 R. 35120 v.2 pAll] ultimately came into ownership of the radio station 
he built. He explained that deregulation enabled some broadcasters to ignore the FCC. 
Companies like Clear Channel, who were not allowed to own more than six stations in a market, 
would hire "lawyer friends" of theirs to buy up stations and hold them until they (Clear Channel) 
could get federal approval. And, while on paper, it looked like the station was owned by someone 
else, it was really being run by the giant broadcaster. [RD 42:4-43:2 R. 35120 v.2 pAll] Mr. 
Rook just couldn't remember the name of these agreements that allowed broadcasters to run the 
radio stations purchased by their "lawyer friends" without getting sued for fraud. See [RD 43:7-
44:2] 
JP Whelan: "Okay, so if I understand you correctly, somebody like AGM would 
come in, and on paper it was owned by AGM, but essentially it was being 
operated by Clear Channel?" 
Rook: Oh, yeah [RD 43:3-7] 
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It is terribly clear that Mr. Rook's bitterness is directed at Clear Channel. He offered 
"When deregulation came along, giant companies with public money can come in and tell you, 
'get the hell out of the water. We're taking your station. If you don't want to take the price we're 
going to give you, we'll take it' and they did." [RD 20:20-25] When asked if Clear Channel was 
one of those big companies with public money, his answer: "The biggest there is" [RD 21 :25-
22:2] There can be no doubt that Mr. Rook views Clear Channel, AGM, and Capstar, all as being 
ultimately driven by the same individuals or the same controlling corporate structure. And, he 
portrays this driving corporate entity as nothing less than a corporate bully. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Capstar argues, that while the Lawrences did offer argument in their opening brief 
relating to attorney fees, that attorney fees should not be awarded because the Lawrences either 
did not cite case law in support of their argument or a statute in support of its motion. Capstar 
then proceeds to cite Bream v. Benscoter, "This Court has repeatedly held it will not consider a 
request for attorney fees on appeal that is not supported by legal authority or argument." 
Lawrence's argument relating to attorney fees cannot be characterized as the same request 
in Benscoter. In their brief, the Benscoters request for attorney fees on appeal consisted of one 
brief sentence i.e. "Benscoter seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 41." In 
its ruling, this Court explained that Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is not the authority for the awarding 
of attorney fees on appeal. It simply provides, "Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must 
assert a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party as 
provided in Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)." Those rules both provide that the party claiming 
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attorney fees on appeal must include that claim as an issue or additional issue on appeal, and the 
party must "state the basis for the claim." Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(6) and 35(b)(6) provide 
that the argument portion of the brief must contain the contentions of the party "with respect to 
the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes and 
parts of the transcript and record relied upon." 
Rule 35 does not require that the party seeking attorney fees is required to cite a legal 
authority in its opening brief. Rather, it simply provides that the party seeking attorney fees must 
state the basis for the claim in their brief. Clearly, Benscoter's request for attorney fees was 
deficient, not because they didn't cite a legal authority, but because they didn't offer any 
argument in support. Our reading of this Court's ruling in Benscoter leaves us with a different 
interpretation. That this Court will consider awards of attorney fees, provided the brief states the 
basis for the claim. And, the Appellants opening brief does state the basis of the claim i.e. that 
Capstar is using this litigation frivolously to pressure the Lawrences into acquiescing property 
rights. And, that Capstar has interfered with the License agreements the Lawrences entered into 
with Great Northern Broadcasting and Nextel, resulting in both agreements being breached. 
As testified to by the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, the Appellant did have a meeting with Kosta Panidis [R. 35120 v.2 p.160 ~'s 
53 & 54], who identified himself to be the General Manager of Clear Channel and the owner of 
the Capstar Tower Site. In that meeting, Mr. Panidis did concede to the Appellant that Clear 
Channel did not have a legal access across the Lawrences' land. And, in a very arrogant and 
condescending manner, only becoming of one who believes he holds all the power, told the 
Appellant that "he didn't care." This fact is uncontroverted because Capstar has never denied Mr. 
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Panidis making that statement and has never presented any rebuttal evidence to the contraryl. 
They have remained totally quiet regarding the conversation between the Appellant and Kosta 
Panidis. 
In their reply brief, Capstar does not deny the Lawrences' allegations that Capstar 
intentionally interfered with the license agreements they entered into with Capstar's tenant Great 
Northern Broadcasting and Nextel. Their entire response to the charge is: "Regarding the claim 
on the license agreement, while disputes with Capstar's tenant may have brought the matter to a 
head, it is not frivolous to resort to a court of law for resolution of the dispute. " Clearly, this is 
no denial, but rather, a rationale justifying their actions. 
Mr. Lawrence's affidavit also testifies that Mr. Lawrence did discuss his intentions to 
enter into a licensing agreement with Great Northern Broadcasting, directly with Kosta Panidis 
prior to the execution of the license. Wiping his hands clean of the matter, Mr. Panidis told Mr. 
Lawrence that it was up to his tenants to work out the access issues with us. At no time did Mr. 
Panidis ever express any reservations or concerns. Quite to the contrary, he gave all appearances 
of being both agreeable and quite supportive of the proposition. 
lThe trial court had stricken the Appellants testimony (above the Appellants objections) 
regarding this meeting as containing heresy. Neither Capstar, nor the trial court, identified which 
part of the testimony contained heresy. Rather, the trial court simply had the whole paragraph 
stricken. The Appellant's testimony in this matter was not heresy, but a first hand account of the 
meeting he had with the General Manager of Clear Channel. It was improper for the trial court to 
strike this testimony. 
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The Great Norther Broadcasting license agreement provides terms for terminating the 
license agreement. Those terms offered that the License may be terminated at any time upon the 
giving of 30 days notice and providing that the Licensee vacates its interest in Blossom 
Mountain. Similar to the Nextel agreement, Great Northern Broadcasting has not provided notice 
that it intends to terminate the license agreement. Rather, it just quit making its monthly 
payments as agreed to in the license agreement. [R. 35120 v.2 p. 161 ~56] 
The Lawrences had grown to rely on the income they were generating from the Nextel 
and Great Northern Broadcasting license agreements. Capstar's intentional interference into these 
license agreements was to induce further financial pressure on the Lawrences with the sole intent 
of making a long and protracted litigation a very difficult proposition for the Lawrences to 
defend. And, it worked. They made it such a costly proposition in the first few years, that the 
Lawrences could no longer afford legal representation and had to take up a Pro Se stance. 
CONCLUSION 
Capstar is certainly willing to offer a share of the blame for this tediously, protracted 
litigation on the Appellants by pointing to our enlargement of time to conduct discovery and J.P. 
Whelan's premature appellate filing. Certainly, no one was more shocked than the two Pro Se 
Appellants to discover that their appeal had been dismissed because their attorney (who 
withdrew soon after) filed the appeal prematurely. The timing of the filing wasn't something 
discussed. The Lawrences just assumed he knew what he was doing with their best interest at 
heart. We're not attorneys and we can honestly claim ignorance. 
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On the other hand, it seems terribly hard to imagine that the dismissal carne as a complete 
surprise to Capstar's attorney. Ms. Weeks certainly wasn't under any obligation to point the defect 
out so that the Pro Se Appellants could pursue their appeal. It's no fault of hers. But it does seem 
somewhat disingenuous of her to accuse a couple of Pro Se Appellants for a delay that she really 
could have prevented. 
Ms. Weeks cautioned the Appellant Douglas Lawrence early in this lawsuit saying that 
"This kind o/litigation could take years to wind its way through the courts." While Ms. Weeks 
didn't pitch her statement as a threat, the inference was certainly unrnistakeable and undeniable. 
After all, what other purpose could there possibly be for offering such a statement to a Pro Se 
Defendant? Mr. Lawrence certainly didn't interpret it as an expression of genuine concern. It was 
intended to be an ominous innuendo of what the Appellants should expect from this litigation, a 
long, drawn out, and expensive affair. 
At deposition, John Rook describes a very similar experience he had with Clear Channel. 
When asked if they (Capstar) like to sue people and drag them into court and do all that sort of 
thing? His answer: "They find a way to get what they want." Mr. Rook is speaking from his first 
hand experience with Clear Channel. According to him, Clear Channel's attorneys made it 
obviously clear, that if they were to loose the action he brought against them, they would just 
appeal. "Because they said, we'll appeal even if we lose, and he'll be dead. He won't live through 
it." [RD 44:14-16] 
Capstar certainly found "a friend of the firm" in the district court and for nine years 
benefited from the favoritism of the district court. Now, in front ofthis Court, they plead that 
Capstar is not entitled to any less careful consideration because they are a corporation and their 
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property rights are just as important as the Lawrences. Capstar never acted like the Lawrences' 
rights were equal to theirs. Capstar didn't have any moral reservations in wrongfully enjoining 
the Lawrences. Nor, did they have any reservations in trying to steal the Lawrences' property 
rights or ruining the Lawrences' dream of raising their children on the 80 acres they purchased 
specifically for that purpose. And, they certainly didn't have any reservations in financially and 
emotionally squeezing the Lawrence family for more than nine years. Capstar intentionally 
interfered with the license agreements the Lawrences made with Great Northern Broadcasting 
and Nextel; and are principally responsible for those companies breaching those agreements. 
And, there can be no doubt, that Capstar is the only party in this litigation that benefits from a 
long and protracted litigation. The characterization that "this has been frustrating for them too" 
simply reeks from the stench of mendacity. 
Capstar didn't need to sue the Lawrences for access. The Lawrences were more than 
willing to negotiate an arrangement with them. But, Capstar was to have no part of any 
negotiation. They had decided, they were bigger; they had more money; and they had lawyers. 
They could just make this litigation so costly and drag it on for so long that the Lawrences would 
simply give in. 
Capstar suggests that we're just playing to this Court's sympathies and passions. No, what 
we are trying to do is to appeal to this Court's sense of justice. Big corporations simply should 
not be allowed to use the judicial system to threaten and bully private citizens. Nor should big 
corporations be allowed to use the judicial system as a financial and emotional vise, simply to 
squeeze individuals into acquiescing their property rights. They do it because they can get away 
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with it. Big corporations know it is a very difficult thing to prove and an even harder argument to 
make, especially for untrained litigants. 
Capstar simply believes that this Court will be more motivated to rule in their favor in an 
effort to avoid creating a land-locked parcel, than ruling on the legal sufficiency oftheir theories. 
What Capstar doesn't want this Court to consider is the fact that Capstar does not have a legal 
access from the Lawrence parcel to the county road. It is undisputed that they do not have access 
across Section 28. Granting Capstar access across the Lawrence parcel would not cure their lack 
of access to the county road. The parcel will still be equally devoid of legal access. 
We ask this Court to overturn the summary judgment and put a final end to their 
complaint. We ask for an award of attorney fees. We also ask for an award of all fees, penalties, 
damages, sanctions, and fines that the Idaho Supreme Court deems to be just, equitable, and 
within the law and jurisdiction of the Idaho Supreme Court to grant for: 1) Nine years of 
wrongfully enjoining the Lawrences; 2) Nine years of trespass; 3) Wrongful interference in our 
license agreements; 4) Nine years of denying the Lawrences their constitutional right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and 5) Irreparable harm to the Lawrences in denying them 
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shall a t all times during the exis te nce of said 
eas ement , maintain said gates and keep them in 
good re pair . 
Grante e i s grant ed trnright to make all 
necessary improvements and ~inor relocations 
on t he present road site across sa i d premises 
i n order to f acilitate moving i ts equipment 
and machines to and from the site of said 
Microwave tower . 
Grantee shall indemnify Grantors for any 
dama ges occasioned by the negligence of Grant ee 
in the use of said easement, provided, however 
Grantee s hall not be responsible to the Grantors 
any damages resulting from actions of third 
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